Le Polonais Roman Ingarden (1893-1970) est un phénoménologue disciple de Husserl à Göttingen. Leur dialogue continu représente le conflit classique entre idéalisme et réalisme, mais aussi la tension qu'est l'articulation entre la description eidétique de régions ontologiques et l'entreprise de constitution génétique du monde. Une première approche à travers quatre des textes d'Ingarden.

The purpose of this paper is to show that the notion of landscape is a phenomenological typical object and a perfect meeting point of different fields of study, and, in particular, a distinctive topic for a dialogue between phenomenology and human sciences. Starting from an analysis of a text of Erwin Straus, we attempt to support the view that into all kinds of landscape—sensory, perceptual, geographical, pictorial or built—we can read various ways of living, dwelling or being in the world, (...) or in other words we can read into them some forms of the original experience. This means that within all landscapes, as embedded in these forms of experience, we can read various ways of living, dwelling or being in the world. So we believe it is possible to constitute and to think a unitary sense of landscape from a phenomenological interpretation of space and human behaviour. (shrink)

L'espace fait partie de ces réalités quotidiennes qui, selon Georges Pérec, loin d'être des évidences, sont en fait des opacités. Opacité au sens de ce qui est toujours déjà là mais sans être jamais interrogé, sans que sa réalité ni sa nature ne soient questionnées. Pourtant l'espace est à la fois notre matière et notre forme, ce dans quoi nous vivons et ce que nous créons, ce qui nous habite et ce que nous tissons. Pour tenter d'éclairer cette réalité énigmatique, (...) nous prendrons un chemin de biais, et nous interrogerons la manière dont les différents arts (peinture, architecture, art des jardins, danse, arts plastiques) s'emparent de l'espace et nous invitent à en faire une expérience à chaque fois singulière et intrigante. (shrink)

Cette étude est née de la remarque troublante d’un roman dans lequel un personnage relit Anna Karénine et se rend compte qu’il a tout oublié de sa première lecture : l’histoire, les émotions vécues alors, tout cela paraît n’avoir pas laissé de traces. Je me suis donc interrogée sur la nature de l’expérience esthétique et le type de souvenir qu’elle engendre. Une expé­rience peut-elle ne pas laisser de traces ? mais alors est-elle encore une expérience ? ou bien peut-on envisager (...) des traces qui ne soient pas des souvenirs disponibles, mobilisables à volonté ? et comment alors les conce­voir ? Il s’agissait donc de cerner à la fois le type d’expérience que forme l’expérience esthétique et le type de souvenirs qui s’y constituent. Partant de Husserl, l’analyse a permis de définir l’expérience esthétique comme expé­rience menée dans la neutralité, sur le mode du quasi ; ce faisant cela paraît accréditer la possibilité qu’il n’y ait pas de réels souvenirs mais seulement des quasi-souvenirs. Néanmoins parce que cette thèse reste paradoxale, j’ai cherché le moyen de concilier à la fois la neutralité existentielle de cette expérience dans l’appréhension de l’objet esthétique et la possibilité d’une affection réelle voire d’une transformation en profondeur du sujet. J’ai alors poursuivi l’examen en m’appuyant sur un texte de Roman Ingarden ( Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerks , § 24) et sur les leçons des synthèses passives de Husserl. L’enjeu de cette recherche engage donc la place et le rôle de l’expérience esthétique dans la constitution de la personnalité. (shrink)

Il s’agira ici de préciser les enjeux, les résultats et les lignes de tension de l’analyse ontologique des œuvres d’art telle qu’elle est développée par Roman Ingarden. Si en effet le programme ontologique d’Ingarden se déploie de manière large et complexe entre ontologie formelle, matérielle et existentiale, il tend aussi à absorber la phénoménologie de la conscience pure en tant que celle-ci constitue une région ontologique spécifique. À partir de ce renversement des rapports entre ontologie et phénoménologie, Ingarden élabore une (...) conception de la constitution réservée aux seuls objets intentionnels et expressément distincte de la phénoménologie génétique transcendantale. Ce faisant Ingarden rencontre sur le terrain esthétique une double difficulté et comme une double contrainte : rendre compte, d’une part, de la constitution des objets esthétiques qui ne sont pas donnés d’avance mais résultent variablement des opérations de concrétisation des divers récepteurs, et déterminer, d’autre part, les conditions de leurs valeurs, lesquelles relèvent à leur tour d’une opération de constitution soumise à variation. Nous essaierons alors d’envisager jusqu’à quel point Ingarden peut maintenir l’approche ontologique en position exclusive. (shrink)

L’article se propose de présenter la conception de la lecture défendue par Roman Ingarden. Elle est comprise comme un processus complexe entre un lecteur et une œuvre littéraire, au cours duquel le lecteur porte la responsabilité de faire exister le sens du texte, soit d’en actualiser la vérité. Cette conception trouve des prolongements et des affinités aussi bien chez Jean-Paul Sartre que chez Hans-Georg Gadamer. Tous les trois s’accordent sur le fait qu’il y a une rectitude de la lecture qui (...) trouve ses normes et ses règles dans l’œuvre mais suppose un lecteur scrupuleux et généreux, qualifié pour s’efforcer d’éviter le relativisme et le nihilisme. La lecture ainsi prise au sérieux s’avère une expérience cognitive et esthétique au service des valeurs. Elle se caractérise comme une expérience de création et de découverte au terme de laquelle la vérité est toujours l’apparition de « la chose même ». (shrink)

Le livre introduit, traduit et annoté par P. Limido-Heulot s’ajoute aux rares traductions françaises des œuvres d’Ingarden: à l’exception d’articles isolés, notons que les traductions de Philibert Secretan et celle de la musicologue montréalaise Dujka Smoje étaient jusqu’à ce jour les seules à reprendre en français sous la forme de livres des ouvrages publiés par le phénoménologue polonais. Bien qu’elle ne nous offre pas un ouvrage intégral d’Ingarden, la traduction de Limido-Heulot regroupe toutefois des textes qui, (...) pour trois d’entre eux, avaient déjà été réunis par l’auteur dans son recueil d’articles Z badan nad filozofia wspolczesna en 1963. (shrink)

Overview -- Locke's internal sense and Kant's changing views -- Personal identity amd its problems -- Rationalist metaphysics of mind -- Consciousness, self-consciousness, and cognition -- Strands of Argument in the Duisburg Nachlass -- A transcendental deduction for a priori concepts -- Synthesis : why and how? -- Arguing for apperception -- The power of apperception -- "I-think" as the destroyer of rational psychology -- Is Kant's theory consistent? -- The normativity objection -- Is Kant's thinker (as such) a free (...) and responsible agent? -- Kant our contemporary. (shrink)

Current treatments of practical rationality understand reasons as considerations counting in favor of or against some practical option, treating the positive and the negative case as symmetrical. Typically the focus is on examples of positive reasons. However, I want to shift the spotlight to negative reasons, as making a tighter or more direct link to rationality — and ultimately to morality, which is what much of the current interest in reasons is meant to clarify. Recognizing a positive/negative asymmetry in normative (...) force will let us reconcile the view of moral or other requirements as based on reasons with the denial that reasons as such, even all-thingsconsidered reasons, yield requirements — or as I like to put it, rationally compel. (shrink)

Correspondence theories are frequently either too vaguely expressed – “true statements correspond to the way things are in the world,” or implausible – “true statements mirror raw, mind-independent reality.” I address this problem by developing features and roles that ought to characterize what I call ldquo;modest” correspondence theories. Of special importance is the role of correspondence in directing our responses to cases of suspected non-factuality; lack of straightforward correspondence shows the need for, and guides us in our choice of, various (...) kinds of reconstrual projects. This, I argue, is in contrast to the approaches suggested by deflationism and coherence, and thus modest correspondence theories are appropriately distinct from rivals. (shrink)

We investigated the role of honour concerns in mediating the effect of nationality and gender on the reported intensity of anger and shame in reaction to insult vignettes. Spain, an honour culture, and The Netherlands, where honour is of less central significance, were selected for comparison. A total of 260 (125 Dutch, 135 Spanish) persons participated in the research. Participants completed a measure of honour concerns and answered questions about emotional reactions of anger and shame to vignettes depicting insults in (...) which type of threat was manipulated. It was found that Spanish participants responded especially intensely to insults that threaten family honour, and that this effect of nationality on emotional reactions to threats to family honour was mediated by individual differences in concern for family honour. (shrink)

A collection of lectures which focussed on the small, constant aggressions of racism.

Asperger's syndrome is a pervasive developmental condition characterized by features of autism. As observed in clinical practice, individuals with Asperger's syndrome present an impairment related to inflexibility in their everyday routine, an immediate manner of experiencing and relating, and difficulties in estimating periods of time. Following a phenomenological perspective, this study is an attempt to examine these aforementioned aspects in terms of temporality. Thirteen participants with Asperger's syndrome, from 13 to 20 years old, were interviewed about their experience of periods (...) of time, personal history, their past, present and future; and their concept of time and finitude. After the interviews, it was possible to identify three general themes which emerged in the invariant aspects of their experience of time: factual experience of present and future dimensions, chronological time and the past experience. Moreover, participants' descriptions evidenced aspects of experience based on the specificity of lived facts and a sense of time specifically related to what was lived in the past. (shrink)

My comments focus on Proops’s treatment of the Paralogisms. I agree with many aspects of his discussion, including his views about the project of Rational Psychology and his analyses of how, exactly, the arguments of the Paralogisms are defective in form, but I disagree with his interpretation of the First Paralogism. I argue that the source of confusion that Kant diagnoses is not the grammatical distribution of ‘I’ as singular, but the fact that the I-representation is both empty and necessary (...) for cognition. (shrink)

How does Kant understand the representation of an empirical self? For Kant, the sources of the representation must be both a priori and a posteriori. Several scholars claim that the a priori part of the ‘self’ representation is supplied by the category of ‘substance,’ either a regular substance (Andrew Chignell), a minimal substance (Karl Ameriks) or a substance analog (Katharina Kraus). However, Kant opens the Paralogisms chapter by announcing that there is a thirteenth ‘transcendental’ concept or category: “We now come (...) to a concept that was not entered in the above general list of transcendental concepts, and that must yet be classed with them … This is the concept – or, if one prefers, the judgment – I think.” (A341/B399). I argue that it is the ‘I think’ that provides the a priori framework for the representation of the empirical self. (shrink)

Innate emotional bases of ethics have been proposed by authors in evolutionary psychology, following Darwin and his sources in eighteenth-century moral philosophy. Philosophers often tend to view such theories as irrelevant to, or even as tending to undermine, the project of moral philosophy. But the importance of emotions to early moral learning gives them a role to play in determining the content of morality. I argue, first, that research on neural circuits indicates that the basic elements or components of emotions (...) need not be limited to what psychologists think of as basic emotions. But in that case, innate mechanisms of social transfer of emotion, such as infants’ tendency to facial imitation, gaze-following, and emotional contagion or empathy, provide a source of plasticity in developing the basic elements that lets emotions incorporate cultural influence from early on. This leaves room later for cognitive components of adult human emotions and hence for the further role of language in conveying cultural influence. We can thus see how moral judgment might depend on innate emotional capacities that are both modifiable by culture and capable of registering objective values. I use Rawls’s treatment of the development of moral sentiments to illustrate the kind of supportive role that emotions can play in a principle-based account – though my own account involves modifications I go on to indicate. (shrink)

A REALIDADE DAS SERRAS CENTRAIS POTIGUARES E A QUESTÃO DO DESENVOLVIMENTO REGIONAL SOB A PERSPECTIVA DO DIREITO, DESENVOLVIMENTO E SUSTENTABILIDADE.

Henri Bergson commencait en 1914 ses conferences d'Edimbourg en precisant que le probleme de la personnalite pouvait etre considere comme le probleme central de la philosophie. Tel est le point de depart d'un ouvrage qui prend au mot cette reflexion de celui que l'on considere habituellement comme le philosophe de la duree a un moment assez avance de sa carriere intellectuelle. L'auteur interroge la maniere dont le concept de personnalite est apparu dans l'ouvre, mais aussi les progres, les problemes qu'il (...) pose, et finalement son role et sa place dans la genese et le developpement de la pensee de Bergson.". (shrink)

This paper focuses on the interpretation of the Italian approximative adverb quasi 'almost' by primarily looking at cases in which it modifies temporal connectives, a domain which, to our knowledge, has been largely unexplored thus far. Consideration of this domain supports the need for a scalar account of the semantics of quasi (close in spirit to Hitzeman's semantic analysis of almost, in: Canakis et al. (eds) Papers from the 28th regional meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, 1992). When paired with (...) suitable analyses of temporal connectives, such an account can provide a simple explanation of the patterns of implication that are observed when quasi modifies locational (e. g. quando 'when'), directional (e. g. fino 'until' and da 'since'), and event-sequencing temporal connectives (e. g. prima 'before' and dopo ' after'). A challenging empirical phenomenon that is observed is a contrast between the modification of fino and da by quasi, on the one hand, and the modification of prima and dopo by the same adverb, on the other. While quasi fino and quasi da behave symmetrically, a puzzling asymmetry is observed between quasi prima and quasi dopo. To explain the asymmetry, we propose an analysis of prima and dopo on which the former has the meaning of the temporal comparative più presto 'earlier', while the latter is seen as an atomic predicate denoting temporal succession between events (Del Prete, Nat Lang Semantics 16: 157-203, 2008). We show that the same pattern of implication observed for quasi prima is attested when quasi modifies overt comparatives, and propose a pragmatic analysis of this pattern that uniformly applies to both cases, thus providing new evidence for the claim that prima is underlyingly a comparative. A major point of this paper is a discussion of the notion of scale which is relevant for the semantics of quasi', in particular, we show that the notion of Horn (entailment-based) scale is not well-suited for handling modification of temporal connectives, and that a more general notion of scale is required in order to provide a uniform analysis of quasi as a cross-categorial modifier. (shrink)

The East/West divide seems to be as old as history itself, the roots of Orientalism and anti-Semitism lying far beyond the origins of modern Western imperialism. The very project of Western classical republicanism had its darker side: to purloin the legacy of the Greeks, distancing them from Eastern systems deemed 'despotic' and 'other'. Western Republicanism and the Oriental Prince is a thoroughly revisionist book, challenging not only the comfortable view the West has of its own political evolution, but the negative (...) stereotypes of non-Western systems. Not only did these images serve to legitimate early modern European nation states struggling for an identity, but they also served to justify slavery and other forms of domination over subject peoples. Drawing upon archaeological and epigraphic evidence, Springborg discusses the Mesopotamian and ancient Egyptian contribution of political forms and cultic institutions to classical Graeco-Roman civilization, an Eastern legacy to the West long obscured for political reasons. A different reading of the foundation myths of Athens and Rome, certain texts of Plato, Aristotle, and the writings of Herodotus, Isocrates, Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus, permits us to restore possible lines of filtration. Renaissance thought, long believed to have ushered in the Western classical republican tradition, demonstrates a curious ambivalence towards powerful Eastern system, objects of fascination as much as fear. We do not yet find sedimented the divide between Western Democracy and oriental despotism, in which post-Reformation thought as been set in stone. This major new study will be of interest to students of political history, political theory, comparative politics and political archaeology. (shrink)